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CO MENTS
RACE DEFA1ATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMEN'T
[T]here is no reason that we should deprive a wise man of any advantage
to his visdome, while we seek to restrain from a fool that vhich being
restrain'd will be no hindrance to his folly.'
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The history of race defamation in the United States has fluctuated between
dormancy and malignancy.2 While the "hate barometer" at present does not
indicate an atmosphere in which a minority would have to fear for its existence3
public opinion is subject to mercurial change.4 Given the catalytic effect of mod-
em mass communications on various segments of the population in times of
racial anxiety,6 concern over the adequacy of our laws7 in curbing the po-
tentially devastating results of class defamation is inevitable.8
II. CPm=-N SANCTIONS AS A rE= DY
A. The Common Law of Criminal Libcl in England
1. In General
Although there is authority for the proposition that there was a defamation
law in England since Roman times,9 the statute De Scandalis Magnatum ° and
1. Milton, Areopagitica, in 4 The Works of John Milton 314 (1931).
2. See generally Myers, History of Bigotry in the United States (Christman rev. ed. 190O).
3. The General Counsel and National Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith suggest that "gutter-level bigots" in the United States are "a concern only at the
police precinct level ... ." Forster & Epstein, Danger on the Right at -viii (1964).
4. For an account of the chameleon-like change in American public opinion repecting
Americans of Japanese ancestry in 1941-1942, see Bogardus, The Making of Public Opinion
212-16 (1951).
5. See generally Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield, 3 Experiments On Mass Communication
(1949).
6. The Harlem and Detroit riots of 1943, dealt with in Alport, The Psychology of Rumor
193-96 (1947), are paralleled by the summer riots of 1964 in Harlem (see N.Y. Times, July
19, 1964, p. 1, col. 4), Bedford-Stuyvesant (see N.Y. Times, July 21, 1964, p. 1, col. 7), and
Rochester (see N.Y. Times, July 25, 1964, p. 1, col. 5). The simultaneous nature of these
riots demonstrates the effect of the mass media on racial groups in time of racial strife.
7. See, e.g., Brown & Stern, Group Defamation in the U.SA., 13 CIev.-Mar. L. Rev. 7
(1964); Clark, The Problem of Group Defamation, 13 Clev.-M.ar. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
S. See generally Belton, The Control of Group Defamation: A Comparative Study of
Law and Its Limitations (pts. 1 & 2), 34 Tul. L. Rev. 299, 469 (1960); Beth, Group Libel and
Free Speech, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 167 (195); Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 Kan.
L. Rev. 295 (1958).
9. See Newell, Slander and Libel 19 (3d ed. 1914), citing Bracton, a writer in the reign
of Henry I (1216-1272). There were no reported cases, however, until the reign of Edward
II (1327-1377). Newell concludes that libel actions became common only after the advent
of printing. Ibid. Furthermore, slander never became a popular action because men of the
realm preferred to defend their own honor rather than turn to the courts. Id. at 19-20.
10. 3 Edw. 1, c. 34 (1275).
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subsequent re-enactments" were the earliest codifications of the law. Limited in
scope, these statutes operated to curb political scandal and thereby prevent
discord between the monarch and his subjects. It was not until the seventeenth
century that, in The Case De Libellis Famosis,12 libel of an ordinary subject
was made a crime. The overwhelming majority of commentators finds the origin
of criminal libel in this court's premise that the libel, by inciting the libeled
person and his kin 13 to revenge, leads to breach of the peace. 14 The court, how-
ever, in rejecting truth as a defense to the crime, spoke also in terms of harm
to the individual, noting that libel "robs a man of his good name, which ought
to be more precious to him than his life . . . and therefore when the Offender
is known, he ought to be severely punished."'5 This dichotomy between harm to
the person and harm to the public appeared in The King v. Burdett,0 which
described libel as "the tendency to a breach of the peace produced . . . by
writing,"' 7 yet reflected that it was as necessary to protect a man's reputation
as it was to protect his property.' 8 Thus, the common-law history of criminal
libel of an individual belies any attempt to categorize it as conceived solely
to protect the public. Yet, it must be conceded that this was the sine qua non
for the crime, whereas the protection of the person was merely an added jtistifica-
tion for the punishment of the defendant.
2. As Applied to Classes
Whether or not one could libel a class of people0 with impunity was unde-
termined until the eighteenth century. Those in favor of extending the criminal
sanctions of common-law libel to protect a class received a sharp setback in 1699
11. 2 Richard 2, stat. 1, c. 5 (1378) ; 12 Richard 2, c. 11 (1388). These statutes were a
precursor of the sedition laws, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 3 (1554), and 1 Eliz. 1, c. 6 (1558), which
were administered by the notorious Star Chamber. See Hudon, Freedom of Speech and Press
in America 9 (1963).
12. 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1609). From this point on, the discussion will
center on libel, since the common law did not impose sanctions for slander. See Newell, Slander
and Libel 1157-58 (3d ed. 1914). If the slander contained blasphemous or "grossly immoral"
words, certain authorities contended that spoken words were indictable. Harris, Criminal Law
101 (12th ed. 1912) ; 4 Stephen, Commentaries on the Laws of England 134 (19th ed. 1928).
From the absence of any case holding slander to be a crime, it is likely that these words were
punished as "an offense of another description," e.g., breach of the peace. Newell, op. cit.
supra at 1157.
13. Thus, even the libel of a dead person was a crime. The Case De Libellis Famosis,
supra note 12; see Holt, Libel 246-47 (1st Am. ed. 1818); 4 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 12, at
136.
14. See, e.g., Button, Libel and Slander 17-18 (1935); Hickson & Carter-Ruck, Libel and
Slander 196-202 (1953) ; 2 Starkie, Slander and Libel *213-15 (2d ed. 1830).
15. 5 Co. Rep. at 125b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 251.
16. 4 Barn. & Aid. 95, 106 Eng. Rep. 873 (K.B. 1820).
17. Id. at 95-96, 106 Eng. Rep. at 873.
18. Id. at 96, 106 Eng. Rep. at 874.
19. The word "class" is used to define a large unit of persons, thus encompassing racial
and religious groups.
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when King's Bench considered a writing entitled "The list of adventurers in
the ladies invention, being a lottery, &c.,' '-' and declared:
Where a writing which inveighs against mankind in general, or against a particular
order of men; as for instance, men of the gown, this is no libel, but it must dezcend
to particulars and individuals to make it a libel.21
The facts of the case, however, severely limit its precedent value. From Lord
Raymond's less often cited but far more detailed report,22 it appears that the
libel concerned completely unknown persons, and, hence, a jury could not say
whether anyone was harmed. Therefore, when the court said that to be action-
able the words must descend to individuals, it was not establishing any criteria
for judging such descent when an individual's class is libeled. The decision is
declaratory of common sense rather than of the common law of class libel.
In 1732, the common law could have been finally resolved when, in the case
of The King & Osbornz,-3 the defendant was tried for publishing a libel against
Jews recently arrived from Portugal. Unfortunately, there are two conflicting
unofficial versions of this case.24 In Barnardiston's report, the court distin-
guished the prior case in that the libeled persons there were totally unascertain-
able, whereas, in the case before it, "the whole community of the Jews are [sic]
struck at. And wherever that is the case... this Court ought to interpose." 23
Kelynge, on the other hand, reported that the court considered not libel, but
breach of the peace as the foundation of the complaint for "tho' it is too general
to make it fall within the Description of a Libel, yet it will be pernicious to
suffer such scandalous Reflections to go unpunished."2 c0 The fact that there was
an actual, rather than a constructive,-7 breach of the peace in this case" lends
support to the Kelynge version. Nevertheless, eight years later, Osborn was cited
for the proposition that, when a class is libeled, every member thereof is stained
by the sweeping brush. 9 As this was the state of the law at the time of the
20. Rex. v. Orme & Nutt, 1 Ld. Raym. 4S6, 91 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1659). (Italics
omitted.)
21. The King v. Alme & Nott, 3 Salk. 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 790 (MI3. 1699). This case is a
different reported version of Rex v. Orme & Nutt.
22. Ibid.
23. 2 Barnard. K.B. 13S (rule to show cause), 166 (rule absolute), 94 Eng. Rep. 40c, 425
(K.B. 1732) ; Kel. W. 230, 25 Eng. Rep. 5S4 (K.B. 1732).
24. Not until the publication of English Law Reports (165 to date) did any report
approach "official" status in England. See Price & Bitner, Effective Legal Research 279 (1953).
Even so, these volumes are only "semi-official," the judges approving and revising the reports
before they are published. Id. at 279 n.35.
25. 2 Barnard. KB. at 166, 94 Eng. Rep. at 429.
26. Rel. W. at 230, 25 Eng. Rep. at SSS.
27. A constructive breach of the peace would be found where words were spohen which
would tend to breach the peace but did not actually lead to a disturbance. Se, e.g, N.Y.
Pen. Law § 722(1).
28. Defendant's words so aroused the community against the Jews that some rioted and
injured the prosecutor, himself a Jew. Kel. W. at 231, 25 Eng. Rep. at 535.
29. King v. Jenour, 7 Mod. 400, 401, 37 Eng. Rep. 1310, 1319 (K.B. 1740).
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creation of our Republic, it is not surprising that common-law authorities merged
these holdings and found a common law of class libel based on a tendency to
breach the peace.3 °
Although a racial or religious group could fairly fit within the protected class
under this definition, it is interesting to note that the English courts in the
nineteenth century gave a more restrictive interpretation to their libel laws. In
1819, the Court of Chancery interpreted Osborn as a conviction for breach of
the peace and expressly rejected the notion that this was a libel case. 1 Bar-
nardiston was vindicated three years later when one Williams, who libeled the
clergy of the diocese of Durham, was convicted on the authority of Osborn "for
a libel reflecting on a public body."8 2 In 1838, however, when a Roman Catho-
lic nunnery was libeled, the court held that, whereas one may not with im-
punity attack a small group, "a person may, without being liable to prosecution
for it, attack Judaism, or Mahomedanism [sic], or even any sect of the
Christian Religion [except for the established religion of the country which
would be an attack on the country itself] . . . ,,38 If the rule were, as this
latter case seems to indicate, that a defendant could not focus his attack on a
small group without implicitly attacking the individual members of the group,3'4
the court must have intended to determine criminal liability in the same man-
ner as it would determine civil liability, i.e., by counting heads to ascertain
personal injury.35
This deviation from accepted common-law criminal libel principles cannot be
justified by the fact that a class, rather than an individual, was the target of the
defamer. It can scarcely be argued that the possibility of riot always increases
as the defendant's barbs reflect on a narrower group to which the defamed per-
son belongs. How could it be said, for example, that a member of the Jewish
War Veterans would be angered by an attack on that organization but passive
to an attack on all Jews? The court, therefore, in its presentation of the common-
law rule, evidenced the fact that the common law was based on practice rather
than on logic.36
30. See, e.g., Bower, Actionable Defamation 426-27 (2d ed. 1923); Holt, Libel 246-47
(1st Am. ed 1818) ; Odgers, Libel and Slander 456-57 (5th ed. 1911).
31. In the Matter of Bedford Charity, 2 Swans. 470, 532, 36 Eng. Rep. 696, 717 (Ch.
1819).
32. Rex v. Williams, S Barn. & Aid. 595, 597, 106 Eng. Rep. 1308 (K.B. 1822).
33. Gathercole's Case, 2 Lew. 237, 254, 168 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1145 (York Summer Ass.
1838).
34. Ibid.
35. See Foxcroft v. Lacy, Hob. 89a, 80 Eng. Rep. 239 (K.B. 1613) ; notes 50-58 infra and
accompanying text.
36. It later became settled in England that, when a class was defamed, the common law
dictated a prosecution for seditious libel or for conspiracy to effect a public mischief, and not
for the spurious common-law crime of class libel. See Opinion of the Counsel to the Crown
(unreported), noted in People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 144, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 260 (Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1938). This opinion was followed in The King v. Leese & Whitehead, Cent. Crim.
Ct., Sept. 21, 1936, noted in People v. Edmondson, supra at 146, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 262. For
a discussion of this case, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1936, p. 20, col. 6. In Jordan v. Burgoyne,
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B. The Awmrican Approach
1. The States
a. Common-law derivation
Unhampered at the time by the limitations of the first amendment concerning
freedom of the press,37 the states were unanimous in the belief that, because of
the ensuing danger to the community if passions were inflamed, the libel of an
individual was not to be tolerated3 5 The ample common-law precedents sur-
rounding individual criminal libel eased the task of the courts in dealing with
such prosecutions. The law of class libel, however, presented innumerable diffi-
culties. Plagued from the beginning by the confusion surrounding their English
common-law antecedents, the early cases gravitated toward the Barnardiston
version of Osborn. In 1815, although a New York court refused a civil remedy
to a member of a libeled regiment, it added that "the offender, in such case, does
not go without punishment. The law has provided a fit and proper remedy, by
indictment; and the generality and extent of such libels mahe them more pecu-
liarly public offenses."- 0 This theory was affirmed in 1840 when, in another New
York civil case,40 the court stated in dictum that, because the words spohen,
though of no particular application to an individual, tend to incite the passions
[1963] 2 Weekly L.R. 1045 (Q.B.), British Fascist leader Colin Jordan, who had bcen
arrested tor haranguing a crowd, was convicted for ordinary breach of the peace under the
Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 &- 1 Geo. 6, c. 6, § S. Were one to engage in such conduct
today, the prosecution would be under the Race Relations Act, 1965l 13 & 14 Eliz. 2, c. 73,
§ 6(1), which provides: "A person shall be guilty. . if, with intent to stir up hatre against
any section of the public in Great Britain distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic or national
origins-(a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive or in-
sulting; or (b) he uses in any public place or at any public meeting words which are threat-
ening, abusive or insulting, being matters or words likely to stir up hatred... 11
37. Iadison would have had the first amendment apply to the states as well as to the
federal government. The House originally adopted such a provision, but later joined the
Senate in striking it from the final text. See Hudon, op. cit. supra note 11, at 6 & nn.32-35.
3S. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-55 & n.4 (1952). Until rccently, there
has not been a serious constitutional challenge to such decisions. Current developments in-
dicate, however, that these rules of law may not be unassailable. Sc Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 US. 64 (1964). In Garrison, it was held that, absent actual malice, a public official
could be attacked without fear of criminal penalty. Id. at 74-75. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, O6
Sup. Ct. 669 (1966), Mr. justice Black formalized his previously pzrsonal attitude, see Jtutice
Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 549, 557-SS
(1962), that all libel laws are unconstitutional in light of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra at 6S0-S1 (separate opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas concurred
in this view, noting that the question is whether "public issues" rather than public officials
are involved. Id. at 677 (concurring opinion). This view has not, as yet, achlevcd general
acceptance in the legal community. See 50 A.BA.J. 7S6 (1964). Nevertheleas, the criminal
remedy has fallen into general disfavor among the states. State v. Browne, S6 N.J. Super. 217,
226-32, 206 A.2d 591, 596-99 (App. Div. 1965).
39. Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. R. 475, 478 (N.Y. Sup. Jud. CL 1315).
40. Ryc-man v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 185 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 10).
19661
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of a community, they are indictable as common-law libel.41 New Hampshire,
in 1868, accepted the New York dictum as law in Palmer v. City of Concord."2
Palmer, a newspaper editor, had sued the municipality under a state statute4a
allowing indemnification against a municipality when property was damaged
as a result of an unlawful riot. The statute precluded recovery if the destruction
was caused by the plaintiff's illegal or improper conduct. The riot in Concord
was touched off by the publication of an article in plaintiff's newspaper imput-
ing cowardice to the Union forces in Virginia during the Civil War. The court
denied recovery on the ground that the article would support an indictment
under the common-law rule enunciated in the New York cases. 44 Although this
doctrine was often used to convict libelers of relatively narrow groups, 45 so
long as the gist of the crime remained the potential breach of the peace,40 a
conviction for the libel of an entire class was not precluded.
The possibility of such a conviction diminished in 1920 with the Texas
Criminal Court's decision in Drozda v. State.47 The court held that the purpose
of criminal libel laws is to punish those who maliciously libel persons; there-
fore, "a government or other body politic . . . religious system, [or] race of
people [is] . . . not subject to criminal libel." 48
In People v. Edmondson,49 the only other decision on point, a New York
court was asked to construe the New York criminal libel statute which pro-
scribed the libel of "persons." 50 The court refused to construe the statute
to include all members of the Jewish religion within the defined protection.
The court rejected the notion that the common law dictated a contrary
holding, finding that the Barnardiston version of Osborn was not a true reflec-
tion of the common law5' and that the American cases were either dicta or
41. Id. at 196 (dictum).
42. 48 N.H. 211 (1868).
43. N.H. Laws of 1854, ch. 1519 (now N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:53 (1955)).
44. 48 N.H. at 215.
45. E.g., People v. Gordan, 63 Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (fourth
degree members of the Knights of Columbus); People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 Pac.
34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1915) (same); Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 559, 147 S.E. 714 (1929)
(same) ; Crane v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 30, 166 Pac. 1110 (1917) (same) ; People v. Splielman,
318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925) (American Legion) ; State v. Hosmer, 72 Ore. 57, 142 Pac.
581 (1914) (a convent); Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 364, 43 S.W. 78 (1897) (street car
conductors).
46. State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 435, 437-38, 24 Pac. 948, 949 (1890).
47. 86 Tex. Crim. 614, 218 S.V. 765 (1920).
48. Id. at 617-18, 218 S.W. at 766.
49. 168 Misc. 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938).
50. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1340 defines libel as "a malicious publication ... which exposes any
living person ... to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes, or tends to cause
any person to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure any person, corpora-
tion or association of persons, in his or their business or occupation . . . ." As this language
is typical of many state libel statutes, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 n.5 (1952),
the Edmondson reasoning would carry over to these jurisdictions.
51. 168 Misc. at 153-54, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68.
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applicable only to narrow groups 52 This case, as did Drozda, defined the
gravamen of the crime as the harm to the individual, 3 which harm decreases
as the size of the group increases. What slight injury is done must be suffered
rather than have the honest commentator stifled.54
While these cases appear correct in their finding that there is no common law
of class libel,05 they err in their reasons therefor. A correct interpretation is
that, given our nation's historical regard for freedom of the press, it cannot be
said that our common law imposes sanctions where the mother country's
common law did not do so unequivocally. Furthermore, a court would not be
on barren constitutional ground in maintaining that, even if there were a com-
mon law of class libel in England, the American Revolution destroyed it along
with the rule of George III. Expressing our founding fathers' concern over the
assault on freedom of expression under the stifling edicts of the mother country,
James Madison stated:
Although I know whenever the great rights ... freedom of the press, or liberty of
conscience, come in question [in Parliament] ... the invasion of them is resAsted by
able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the
security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed.G
Hence, Iadison concluded that "the state of the press ... under the common
law, cannot.. . be the standard of its freedom in the United States."*7
The misinterpretation by many early American courts of the gist of common-
law libel as harm to the individual as much as harm to the public has carried
over to a majority of the states which wished to retain their criminal sanctions
against individual libel even after, with the decline of the custom of duelingf s
breaches of the peace occasioned by libel became rare. Thus, today, of the states
which characterize the crimep only five list libel with crimes tending to breach
the peace,60 while thirteen place it with offenses against the person or reputa-
52. Id. at 147-53, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 262-67.
53. Id. at 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 26S.
54. The Edmondson court's decision could have been predicated on constitutional con-
siderations, for a defendant could not have been e.pected to know, from the wording of the
New York statute, that class libel was punishable. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230
(1951); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 US. 451, 453 (1939).
55' See notes 19-36 supra and accompanying text.
56. 1 Cong. Deb. 453 (134) [1789-17g0].
57. 6 Writings of James Madison (1790-1802) 3S7 (Hunt cd. 1906). Jefferlson was no 1-,
adamant, maintaining that "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a govern-
ment without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not heitate a
moment to prefer the latter." Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1737, in The
Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 411-12 (Koch & Peden ed. 1944). The mo-t
consenrative position is that the Bill of Rights guaranteed only immunities inherited from
the common law. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 231-S2 (1897).
53. See Tanenbaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L.Q. 261, 273 (1950).
59. Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-hire, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and West Virginia punish the offense as a common-law crime. The other statcs have
codified their prohibitions. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 255 n.5 (1952).
60. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-S-13 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4413 (1963); S.C.
19661
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tion. 61 Libel laws allowing convictions where there was no tendency to breach
the peace are clearly in derogation of the common law. The duality of justifi-
cation reappeared as the states attempted to enact specific provisions against
class libel. 62
b. Specific statutory enactment
With the decline of the doctrine of common-law class libel, certain states
sought to retain the existing criminal remedy, or to create one by enacting
statutes aimed at the race defamer. Most are couched in terms of libel law as
well as in terms of breach of the peace. If the former is the raison d'etre, the
statute is probably unconstitutional. If enacted to keep the peace, the statute
is redundant in light of existing breach of the peace laws63 and, hence, unneces-
sary.
The New Jersey statute has the distinction of being the only one thus far
found unconstitutional by the state itself. The statute declared criminally liable:
Any person who shall, in the presence of two or more persons, in any language,
make or utter any speech, statement or declaration, which in any way incites, coun-
sels, promotes, or advocates hatred, abuse, violence or hostility against any group
or groups of persons . . . by reason of race, color, religion or manner of worship
64
When the German-American Bund violated this statute in 1941, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in State v. Klapprott,", found the act violative of both
the federal and state constitutional provisions of freedom of speech. In a sound
opinion, the court noted that, since the statute was in derogation of the common
law, it had to be construed strictly. Thus, judged according to its weaknesses
rather than according to its strength, 6 the instant statute was too vague and
indefinite, as well as destructive of personal liberties. As the court illustrated,
a statement made in the privacy of one's home could be a criminal act if the
household were made up of more than two members.07 Teachers could not
Code Ann. § 16-161 (1962); Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-256 (1960); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-117
(1957).
61. Alaska Stat. § 11.15310 (Supp. 1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2101 (1953); La. Rev.
Stat. § 14:47 (1950); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.410 (1949); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-440 (1964);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.510 (1963); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-11-1 (1953); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14:47 (1953); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.37 (Page Supp. 1965); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 771
(1961) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 163.410 (1963) ; Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1269 (1953) ; Wis. Stat.
§ 942.01 (1961).
62. See notes 63-76, 88-100 infra and accompanying text. Since scurrilous literature has
not been held to be inherently obscene, People v. Eastman, 188 N.Y. 478, 480, 81 N.E. 459,
460 (1907) (concurring opinion), the only criminal sanction against a race defamer would be
a specific statute declaring such conduct illegal.
63. See, e.g., N.Y. Pen. Law § 722.
64. Laws of N.J. 1935, ch. 151, § 5.
65. 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
66. The court was referring to a criminal class slander statute, but, as has been noted,
see notes 19-36 supra and accompanying text, a class libel statute would be under the same
handicap.
67. 127 N.J.L. at 402-03, 22 A.2d at 881.
[Vol. 34
966]COMMENTS
lecture on the history of various races for fear that their remarks might breed
"hatred," "abuse," and "hostility," if indeed such words could be defined.0s
Whether a statute can be drawn which meets all of the mandates of the
Constitution is one of the critical questions in this field, which the present
statutes leave unanswered. The Indiana legislation,c9 the farthest reaching of
any thus far passed, proscribes both race libel and race slander. Enacted in
1947, the statute purports to protect the "econonie welfare, health, peace,
domestic tranquility, morals, property rights and interests" 70 of the people by
outlawing "racketeering in hatred,"71 defined, inter alia, as:
person or persons acting with malice to create, advocate, spread, or disseminate
hatred for or against any person, persons or group of persons, individually or col-
lectively, by reason of race, color or religion which threatens to, tends to, or causes
riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the streets . destruction of property,
breach of peace, violence, or denial of civil or constitutional rights.Y2
In spite of the legislature's admonition that this statute should not "be construed
to prohibit any right protected by the federal constitution or the constitution
of the state of Indiana . . .73 it is doubtful that it could be considered consti-
tutional under the sound principles of Klapprott."
The Massachusetts attempt at such legislation 75 is much more modest in its
aims. The 1943 act forbids the publishing of "any false written or printed
material with intent to maliciously promote hatred of any group of persons in
the commonwealth because of race, color or religion.....,76 It is evident that
the 'Massachusetts legislators were more concerned with the civil liberties pro-
blem posed by such a statute than were their Indiana brethren, for both malice
and mendacity are requisite elements of the criminal act. Their concern, how-
ever, does not lessen the constitutional problems posed. At common law, truth
was not a defense to libel. In fact, under the prevailing view,77 the veracity of a
statement aggravated the offense because it was considered more likey to lead
63. Ibid.
69. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 10-904 to -914 (1956).
70. Ind. Ann. Stat.§ 10-904 (1956).
71. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-906 (1956).
72. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-905(B) (1956).
73. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-913 (1956).
74. Tanenhaus, supra note 53, at 232-S3. Recently, a defendant was tried for a violation
of the statute, and his motion to quash the indictment was granted. State v. Dexield, Cause
No. 13437, Ind. Super. CL, April 10, 1964. An Indiana grand jury refused to indict members
of the Ku Klux Klan who were sending Klan literature through the mail. Letter From Wini-
fred Al. Hackett, Executive Secretary, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, to the Fordham Lay,,
Review, Feb. 22, 1966, on file in the Fordham Law Review Office. The Indiana Citil Liberties
Union hopes to take a test case into the federal courts to present their argument that the
statute is unconstitutional.
75. Mlass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 9SC (1956).
76. Ibid.
77. Blackstone, Commentaries 62-13 n.7 (4th ed. Chase 1923). This theory was carried
over to the colonies and accepted as common law. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337
(N.Y. 1304); Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 43, 46 (1931).
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to a breach of the peace. Not until Lord Campbell's Act78 in 1843 did truth,
coupled with good motives, qualify as a defense. Most states adopted this
statutory variant of the common law7 9 and some have even made it a matter of
state constitutional law.80 Were they not so inclined, however, the United
States Supreme Court probably would not hold the statute unconstitutional on
that ground alone, unless a public official were libeled, for only then is "the in-
terest in private reputation ... overborne by the larger public interest, secured
by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth."8'
It is the very defense of truth, ironically, which serves to render the statute
ineffective and even potentially harmful to the group it is trying to protect.8 2
A theoretical case should demonstrate the illusory nature of the protection and
the advisability of state legislatures having second thoughts about these
statutes.
Suppose a neo-Nazi, proclaiming that all Jews are communists and murderers,
was indicted under the state statute on the complaint of a member of the
Jewish community. At the trial, the jury, no member of which would be a Jew
because of the issue involved, would contain a cross section of the community,
some of whom would be patently or latently bigoted. Only the former would
be removed at the impanelling. Thus, the possibility exists that, regardless of
defendant's statements, he might escape conviction, thereby lending the prestige
of the court to his statement. Assuming that the jury were free from prejudice,
there would remain the problem of disproving truth. How is truth to be deter-
mined? In terms of an individual, it is difficult. With respect to a class, it is
nearly impossible. Granted that the race-baiter might make a statement which
could be proven false, the educated bigot could easily weave a pattern of half-
truths which could not be proven false beyond a reasonable doubt.8 3
Adding to the problem is the fact that, by being brought to trial, the defen-
dant is supplied a forum from which he can expound his views, complete with
local and even national coverage by the mass media.8 4 If acquitted, he could
78. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, § 6 (1843).
79. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.15.320 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-353 (1956). See
also statutes cited in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 n.7 (1964). In some states, truth
alone is a complete defense. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. II, § 10; N.M. Const. art. II, § 17.
80. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 1 § 9; Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights § 13.
81. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). (Footnote omitted.)
82. Minnesota has recently joined the list of states attempting to provide relief In this
area. Minn. Stat. § 609.765 (1964). This statute, like the Indiana statute, would pro-
hibit all defamatory matter, defined as "anything which exposes a person or a group, class
or association to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace in society, or injury to
his or its business or occupation." Minn. Stat. § 609.765(1) (1964).
83. Nor would the requirement that good motives, as well as truth, be present to consti-
tute a defense alleviate this problem. See note 109 infra.
84. When arrested in New York City recently on a disorderly conduct charge, George
Lincoln Rockwell, self-proclaimed "fiihrer" of the American Nazi Party, stated: ," 'This arrest
has given me more publicity than anything I could've done on my own. Contributions to tho
party depend on publicity."' Krim, Jewish Counsel for Nazi Berated, N.Y. Herald Tribune,
Feb. 11, 1966, p. 17, cols. 5, 7.
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proclaim his struggle as a victory for truth. If the jury cannot reach a verdict,
he gets a new trial with expanded "air time." Should he be convicted, chances
are that he would receive a light fine.sa If sent to jail, he would probably
spend the time, while waiting for his conviction to be reversed on constitutional
grounds, writing his memoirs, and emerge as a martyr to his followers. This
situation is not unknown to history.80 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
majority of minority group representatives are not on record as favoring class
libel legislation.Sr
There have also been attempts to confine legislation in this area to income-
producing hate mongering. Connecticut, for one, forbids holding up to ridicule
or contempt by advertisement "any person or class of persons, on account of
creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality or race .... ,3 West Virginia
extends a similar ban to exhibits, displays, theatres, movies and other places of
public amusement.6 9 Although the constitutionality of these statutes has not as
yet been tested, it must be noted that the protection of the first amendment is
not lifted merely because income is being produced from the defendant's opera-
tion 0o This statute, therefore, like its broader based counterparts, would be
85. With the exception of Indiana, ind. Ann. Stat. § 10- C3 (1956), the states which
punish this conduct dassify it as a misdemeanor, IM. Rev. Stat. ch. 33, § 27-1kb) (194);
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 9SC (1956) ; minn. Stat. § C09.765(2) (1964).
86. See Bullock, Hitler-A Study in Tyranny 109-10 (rev. ed. 195S).
87. The American Jewish Congress (Robison, Statement Submitted for the Con-sderation
of the Commission on Individual Freedom and Jewish Security of the National Community
Relations Advisory Council, Jan. 24, 1966), and the American Jevsh Committee (Letter
From Rhonda L. Goodkin, Director, Legal Division, American Jevih Committee, to the
Fordham Law Review, Feb. 1, 1966, on file in the Fordham Law Review Office), are off1-
daily opposed to such laws. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple sees no merit in such laws. Letter From Mlaria L. Marcus, isodate Counzd, NAAt,,CP,
to the Fordham Law Review, Jan. 26, 1966, on file in the Fordham Law Review Office. The
Congress of Racial Equality (Letter From Carl Rachlin, General Counzel, CORE, to the
Fordham Law Review, Jan. 24, 1966, on file in the Fordham Law: Review Office), and the
National Urban League, Inc. (Letter From Arthur Q. Funn, Le-,al Counsel, National Urban
League, Inc., to the Fordham Law Reviev, Jan. 24, 1966, on file in the Fordham Law Re-
view Office), have taken no official position.
The Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith is not opposed in principle to a dasa libel
statute, but has not found any of the existing laws or proposals satisfactory. National Civil
Rights Committee of the ADL, Recommendation, adopted at the Convention of the National
Committee of the ADL, New York City, Jan. 29 to Feb. 1, 1966. The Jev-ish War Veterans,
U.S.A., support such legislation. Je.sh War Veterans, U.S.., Statement Submitted for the
Consideration of the Commission of Individual Freedom and Jewish Security of the National
Community Relations Advisory Council, Jan. 24, 1966.
Not infrequently, these groups act as amicus curiae, defending the right of the defamer
to attack their race. See, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 16S Misc. 142-43, 4 X.YS.2d 257,
258-59 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 193S).
8S. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-37 (195S).
S9. U. Va. Code Ann. § 6109 (1961).
90. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1951); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
531 (1945).
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judged by the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
its only class libel decision, Beaukarnais v. Illinois."
The 1917 Illinois statute which gave rise to the prosecution in this case was
also the first attempt at class libel legislation. In wording, it was not unlike the
West Virginia statute:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or
offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state
any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition
portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of
any race, color, creed or religion ...to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is
productive of breach of the peace or riots .... 92
The Illinois courts, however, extended the coverage of the statute to literature
of any typeY3 When, in 1941, the statute was used to prosecute members of
the Jehovah's Witnesses, the federal district court refused to grant the sect an
injunction against the state's action because it was not "clearly apparent that
the statute in question is unconstitutional.194
Constitutionality was still in issue in 1950 when Beauharnais, the president
of the "White Circle League of America," distributed literature in public warn-
ing of the menace presented by the Negroes in Chicago. The pamphlets called
for the white people of Chicago to petition the mayor and city council to aid in
preserving and protecting the rights of white citizens. The high court of Illinois
sustained Beauharnais' conviction under the class defamation statute 0 The
court noted that defendant's writings represented "fighting words"0 0 which are
not protected by the Constitution,97 but pr'edicated the conviction on the
libelous aspects of Beauharnais' literature.98 Basing his defense on libel, the
gist of the complaint, Beauharnais offered to present evidence to support the
veracity of his allegations (e.g., high crime rates among Negroes), for, in Illinois,
truth accompanied by good motives is a defense to libel.99 The trial court re-
jected this attempt, and the appellate court affirmed on the ground that "such
proof would be directed only as to a portion of the offense charged and could
not in any manner be classed as published for good motives and for justifiable
ends."100
91. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; see notes 101-18 infra and accompanying text. Florida, Fla. Stat.
§ 836.11 (1961), and Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4414 (1963), proscribe the anony-
mous publication of scurrilous literature. These statutes would, of course, be no deterrent
to the publicity-seeking racist.
92. Laws of I1. 1917, at 363 (now lI. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 27-1 (1965)).
93. People v. Simcox, 379 I1. 347, 350, 40 N.E.2d 525, 526 (1942) (dictum).
94. Bevins v. Prindable, 39 F. Supp. 708, 712 (E.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 314 U.S. 573
(1941).
95. People v. Beauharnais, 408 I. 512, 97 N.E.2d 343 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
96. 408 I1. at 517, 97 N.E.2d at 346.
97. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
98. 408 IMl. at 517-18, 97 N.E.2d at 346-47.
99. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 27-2 (1964).
100. 408 Ili. at 518, 97 N.E.2d at 347. The court cited the Bevins decision as authority
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a five-to-four decision10 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, delivering the opinion of the Court, classified the statute
as a libel law.10 2 He found common-law precedent 0 3 for such a statute, based
on the tendency of the criminal words to lead to breaches of the peace. 0 4 The
Justice noted that, since the racial climate in Chicago had been potentially
explosive ever since the statute came into being, the state had the right and
even responsibility to protect its citizens from the harm which could ensue from
the distribution of such literature.'0° The construction of the statute by the
Illinois court was found to be such that it cured any objectionable vagueness
in the statute itself.'00 Mr. Justice Frankfurter refused to consider the tradi-
tional defenses to libel, e.g., privilege and fair comment,1 7 because they were
not before the Court. 0 s Illinois' rejection of the defendant's attempt to show
truth, on the ground that it was not accompanied by proof of good motive, 03
was accepted as good law." 0 The contents of the leaflet, therefore, were found
to be libelous, beyond the protection of the first amendment, and punishable
without the establishment of a "clear and present danger.""'
that the United States Supreme Court found the statute constitutional. Id. at 517, 97 N.E2d
at 346. This is not the case. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
101. Beauharnais v. Ilinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
102. Id. at 253-54.
103. Thus, this case can be distinguished from State v. Klapprott, 127 N.JL. 395, 22 A2d
877 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See notes 65-6S supra and accompanying text.
104. 343 U.S. at 254.
105. Id. at 258-62.
105. Id. at 253. The rule is that statutes may be construed to eliminate constitutional ob-
jections, and state statutes are presumed to be construed constitutionally by the state courts.
Fox v. Washington, 236 US. 273, 277 (1915).
107. See Prosser, Torts §§ 109-10 (3d ed. 1964).
103. 343 U.S. at 265 n.22.
109. Defendant was, in fact, questioned by his attorney about his motives, but an objec-
tion to this line of questioning was sustained. Beauharnais neither made an offer of proof, nor
raised the question on appeal to the state appellate court. Ibid.
Although he found the statute constitutional, Mr. Justice Jackson dissented because the
application of the statute did not sufficiently protect defendant's rights. Id. at 237. Since
Beauharnais was denied the opportunity to prove the truth of his statements, "how could
he show that he spoke truth for good ends?" Id. at 300. Furthermore Mr. Justice Jackson
stated that the privilege doctrine should be considered, espzcially since the defendant was
petitioning for a redress of grievances. Id. at 301. Finally, he stated that the "clear and
present danger doctrine," see text accompanying notes 163-90 infra, was applicable to this
ituation, for the danger induced by the libel is an element of the crime. 343 U.S. at 303-04.
The case serves to demonstrate that state limitations on the power to prosecute, e.g., the
requirement of "malice" or "bad motives," are meaningl-ks. If actual malice is rcquired, the
well-meaning bigot is free to defame whomever he pleases. If only implied malice is requiite,
the defamatory statement must be judged, as must the defamer's motives, by the standards
of the community. The questions of malice and motive, therefore, would merge into the
question of guilt and, hence, are not significant standards.
110. Id. at 265-66.
111. Id. at 266; see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919); text accompany-
ing notes 166 & 167 infra.
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Mr. Justice Reed, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined in dissenting, argued
that the statute itself was so broad that it permitted the stifling of protected
liberties within its scope.3 2 Neither the construction of this statute by the state
courts nor the mere definition of the statute as a "libel law" rendered inappli-
cable the rule of Winters v. New York,"13 which would hold unconstitutional
any statute imposing criminal sanctions on protected speech." 4
In stronger language, Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas
also joined in dissenting, described the statute as a return to the Star Cham-
ber." 5 The Justice rejected the notion that a statute confining freedom of the
press could be found constitutional merely because it had a rational basis, and
characterized this expansion of criminal libel law, from words directed at an
individual to words directed at a group, as a degradation of the first amend-
ment." 6 In the Justice's view, the constant liberties secured by the first amend-
ment would be endangered if left to the mercy of the majority of the Court on
a case-by-case approach." 7 Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent, predicted
that state experimentation in the field of civil liberties would serve as "a warn-
ing to every minority that when the Constitution guarantees free speech it
does not mean what it says."" 8
The Beauharnais decision still stands, but, in light of the composition of the
present Court, and the limitations it has already placed on the right of the state
to legislate against libel," 0 any reliance on the holding would have to be
112. 343 U.S. at 281-84 (dissenting opinion).
113. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). See 343 U.S. at 280-84 (dissenting opinion).
114. 333 U.S. at 509. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) ; Hague v. Commit-
tee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). Furthermore, the statute was not suffi-
ciently definite for the Court to fix its construction as constitutional. 343 U.S. at 281-282
(dissenting opinion) ; cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
115. 343 U.S. at 273 (dissenting opinion).
116. Id. at 269 (dissenting opinion).
117. Id. at 274-75 (dissenting opinion). Where the wall of protection offered by the first
amendment is breached, other liberties may fall. The Beauharnais holding, for example, has
been used to support the suppression of literature, Planned Parenthood Comm., Inc. v. Marl-
copa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719 (1962); Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 916-17,
383 P.2d 152, 162, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 810, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), to take away the
license of a bar featuring "obscene entertainment," Tahiti Bar, Inc., 186 Pa. Super. 214, 142
A.2d 491 (1958), aff'd, 395 Pa. 355, 150 A.2d 112 (1959), appeal dismissed per curiam sub
nom. Tahiti Bar, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 361 U.S. 85 (1959), and in support
of loyalty oath requirements, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 10, 381 P.2d 554, 558-59 (1963),
vacated, 378 U.S. 127, orig. judgment reinstated, 97 Ariz. 140, 397 P.2d 944 (1964), rev'd, 34
U.S.L. Week 4347 (U.S. April 19, 1966).
118. 343 U.S. at 287 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas has not tempered his be-
liefs as to the unconstitutionality of Beauharnais, and has asked that it be overruled as a
"misfit in our constitutional system." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
119. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), where the Court unanimously
overturned a state conviction for libel of certain members of the Louisiana judiciary. The
principle earlier adopted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that
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severely qualified. Given the fact that class libel laws are of slight efficacy and of
doubtful constitutionality, 20 they should be repealed by the legislatures in the
states where they do exist,12 1 for their very existence is a burden on legitimate
social commentatorsY s2
2. The Federal Government
Present federal legislation provides only limited protection to minority
groups.12 One statute imposes criminal sanctions on the mailing of "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile . . . matter."'' 2 1 "Indecent" is defined
as of a character tending to incite to arson, murder or assassination.12 Although
this statute would not bar insulting literature, such as that published in Beau-
harnais, it might serve to prevent the mails from being used to urge violence
against minority groups.
absent calculated falsehood one may v.ith impunity fall short of the truth in criticizing a
public official, was extended to criminal actions. Mr. justice Brennan, writing for the Garri-
son Court, noted that criminal libel law is a declining doctrine and one which was not placed
in the Model Code of the American Law Institute, 379 US. at 69-70, which recommended
such laws only where designed to curb words "especially likely to lead to public dizorders,"
Model Penal Code § 250.7, comment 2, at 45 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). Justices Black and
Douglas would have extended the holding to allow even malicious defamation of public
officials, in order to obliterate every remnant of the law of sedition. This privi ge doctrine
could be extended to cover "public classes," e.g., Jews and Catholics, and thus negate any
Beauharnais-typa conviction. See note 153 infra and accompanying text.
120. See 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 116-30 (1947). Pcrh3p fearing
the strength of the protection offered by the Beauharnais case, the Illinois Legi-Lature has
since changed its statute to read: "A person commits criminal defamation when, with intent
to defame another, living or dead, he communicates by any means to any pzron mattcr
which tends to provoke a breach of the peace." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 27-1(a) (1965). The
comments to the statute admit that the old criminal libel law failed in its attempt to mitigate
the harm done to the individual. By phrasing the crime in terms of breach of the peac-,
the legislature was able to forbid class slander as well as class libel by fitting both under the
Chaplinsky "fighting words" doctrine. See notes 179-S3 infra and accompanying text. The
statute was used to convict '"White Youth Corps" demonstrators in Chicago in 1964. Defen-
dants were found to have violated both the class libel and breach of the peace statutes.
City of Chicago v. Lambert, 47 MII. App. 2d 151, 197 N.E2d 44S (1964). It is difficult to sea
why the latter statute would not suffice in every such instance.
121. Unfortunately, new bills are perennially being brought up for consideration in state
legislatures. See, e.g., Sen. Intro. .No. 1056, Pr. No. 1056, Azs. Intro. No. 2504, Pr. No. 2510,
N.Y. State Leg. I3th Sess. (1965); Sen. Intro. No. 1573, Pr. No. 10D, Ass. Intro. No. 2311,
Pr. No. 2326, N.Y. State Leg. 18Mth Sess. (1965); Sen. Intro. No. 1033, Pr. No. 1033, N.1.
State Leg. ISth Sess. (1965) ; Sen. Intro. No. 173S, Pr. No. 1766, N.Y. State Leg. IMth Ses.
(1965) ; Ass. Intro. No. 257, Pr. No. 257, N.Y. State Leg. IS9th Sess. (1966) ; Ass. Intro. No.
933, Pr. No. 933, N.Y. State Leg. 1S9th Sess. (1966).
122. Cf. Poe -. UlIman, 367 US. 497, 513-15 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123. See generally Staff of House Comm. on the judiciary, 38th Cong., 1st Sea , Report
on Proposed Federal Group Libel Legislation (Comm. Pint 1963).
124. 13 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
125. Ibid.
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Another statute proscribes the mailing by postal card or on the outside of an
envelope of "any delineation, epithet, term, or language of libelous, scurrilous,
defamatory, or threatening character, or calculated by the terms or manner or
style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character
or conduct of another .... '126 The words of the statute, unfortunately, reflect
no positive congressional intent to extend the ban to encompass attacks on
classes. The ambiguity of the statute is reflected in the illogical development
of the case law. In 1910, the Eighth Circuit held that a prosecution under the
statute does not proceed as one for libel.'2 7 The Ninth Circuit, in a nebulous
opinion, later added that the statute is penal in nature and must be strictly
construed. 128 Meanwhile, the Second Circuit, treating the statute as libel legisla-
tion, declined to apply it to the defamation of a group, since such conduct was
not criminal at common law.' 29 A recent decision in the Tenth Circuit,'10
however, held that, since the statute was cast in the disjunctive, it was meant
to regulate the mails in addition to combatting libel. Under this rationale, the
writer could be prohibited from using the mail under the regulatory power
without falling under the strict libel rules. Hopefully, this decision will be
extended to cover class libel, thereby releasing the postal employee from the role
of captive audience and knowing disseminator of vile material.
Of the proposed federal mailing remedies aimed directly at the class de-
famer,' 3 ' the most thoughtful was the 1949 proposal of Representatives
Javits, 132 Klein, 33 Dawson,134 Keating' 35 and Keogh.136 The bills contained
multiple safeguards for the civil liberties of the sender, requiring for conviction
proof of an "intent to create ill will against a racial or religious group," as well
as a knowingly false statement. 37 The very protections offered, however, would
have rendered the statute proposed as ineffective as the state statutes. 18s Thus,
the bill's ultimate demise is hardly a matter of concern to the minority groups.1 9
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1964).
127. Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (8th Cir. 1910).
128. McKnight v. United States, 78 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1935).
129. American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Kiely, 40 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1930).
130. McCrossen v. United States, 339 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1965).
131. See H.R. 7434, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) ; H.R. 8033, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952);
Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L.Q. 261, 293-97 (1950).
132. H.R. 2269, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
133. H.R. 2270, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
134. H.R. 2271, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
135. H.R. 2272, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
136. H.R. 2273, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
137. E.g., H.R. 2269, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
138. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
139. The United States House of Representatives has recently passed legislation, H.R. 980,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), which would allow a person to return, to the Postmaster Gen-
eral, material which, in his opinion, is obscene, and to request the Postmaster General to
notify the sender not to mail such items to him. The Attorney General, upon request of the
Postmaster General, may seek a federal district court order demanding compliance, the viola-
tion of which could be punished by the court as contempt. It is conceivable that certain
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III. THE Cnrm REMEDY
A. Injunction Against Abuse
Following the example of the State of Indiana,'-" the use of injunctions could
be proposed as a potential remedy against the race-baiter. The Province of
Manitoba is the only other common-law jurisdiction to afford similar relief.
The latter jurisdiction's statute4 1 allows any member of a racial, religious, or
national group to obtain an injunction against the publication of scurrilous
literature directed against his group. Aside from the fact that this remedy would
present innumerable procedural difficulties in determining who is the represen-
tative Negro, Catholic, or Italo-Canadian, the statute, like its Indiana counter-
part, would clearly be unconstitutional in the United States under the doctrine
of Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.4'
In 1931, Near was enjoined from publishing libelous matter directed at cer-
tain individuals and Jews in general, under the appropriate 'Minnesota statute. 42
The United States Supreme Court, exercising its newly declared power under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, r'- found that the statute
violated the first amendment. To hold otherwise, Ir. Chief Justice Hughes
declared, would be a long stride toward complete cesorship,'1 The Court was
unquestionably justified in striking down a statute which would have forced a
publisher to convince a judge, prior to publication, that his material was worthy
of being disseminated.' 46 Even in the restrictive atmosphere of eighteenth
century England, "every freeman [had] . . . an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he [pleased] ... before the public: [for] to forbid this [was] ...
to destroy the freedom of the press .... 114 It cannot be seriously contended
that the founding fathers envisioned fewer rights under the Constitution.
racist literature could fall into this category. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 219, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965); Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 Gco. LJ. 30 (1965).
140. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-907 (1956).
141. Ian. Rev. Stat. c. 60, § 20 (1954).
142. 2833 U.S. 697 (1931).
143. flinn. Laws 1925, ch. 285, §§ 1-3.
144. Gitlow v. New York, 26S US. 652, 666 (1925); accord, Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 3S0 (1927); Wltney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927).
145. 283 U.S. at 721.
146. The prohibition against prior restraint would prevent a state body from refusing to
grant a license to speak in a public park unless the statute giving it this power were narrowly
drawn and contained adequate standards. Niemotko %. Maryland, 340 US. 263, 271 (19S1)
(Jehovah's Witnesses invalidly denied a license). New York has extended this rule to cover
the American Nazi Party, which could not be denied access to a park merely on the basis
of its bad reputation in other jurisdictions. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 211
N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S2d 263, cerL denied,
368 U.S. 913 (1961).
147. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *152. If, however, the publication were "improper, mis-
chievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity." Ibid.
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B. Damages
It is unlikely that the traditional civil remedy of damages will ever become
available to members of a defamed class. Although a cause of action for defama-
tion will lie in favor of two or more persons,1 48 it is well settled that, where a
group or class has been defamed, a member thereof must show individual appli-
cation to himself in order to recover.149 Because this individual application
cannot be readily demonstrated where the group is large, in this instance
neither the members nor the group as a whole will recover.150 This common-
law rule' 51 is, despite an occasional deviation from the norm,15 2 mechanically
applied. The counting of heads to determine injury is founded in both logic and
expediency. It is generally considered that "language which would be read
seriously if written as to an individual might not be capable of serious appli-
cation to each member of a large group; [for] that which is general may
become vague; [and] that which is specific may become ridiculously extrava-
gant."'1 53 It has been suggested that' the problem of harassing the defendant with
multiple suits could be alleviated by the use of a class action.'5 4 It is doubtful,
however, that anyone could be designated as an adequate representative of a
race.
Until 1962, the mechanical process had narrowed recovery to a group of
twenty-five. 155 In that year, a member of a football team consisting of sixty or
seventy players recovered upon the somewhat startling observation of an Okla-
homa court that the controlling factor should be the intensity of the suspicion
cast on the plaintiff, rather than the size of the group.'50 Even if this reasoning
148. See, e.g., Chapa v. Abernethy, 175 S.W. 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (members of a
posse).
149. Prosser, Torts § 106, at 767-69 (3d ed. 1964).
150. Ibid.
151. See Foxcroft v. Lacy, Hob. 89a, 80 Eng. Rep. 239 (C.P. 1613).
152. In the Quebec Province case of Ortenberg v. Plamondon, 35 Can. L.T. 262 (Que. Ct.
App. 1914), two Jewish merchants were allowed to recover damages against a defendant
who libeled all the Jews in Quebec. The Jewish population of Quebec consisted of 75 famllles.
The court, while adhering to the principle that, "if the collectivity is numerous there is no
right of action, because the injury in that case is not deemed to indicate any one person" and,
hence, a Jew could not recover for a libel against all Jews, id. at 266, allowed recovery, be-
cause whether individual application could be found was "a question of fact left to the dis-
cretion and wisdom of the Courts," ibid. This case has not been followed in the United States,
where it has been distinguished on the ground that Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction. Louis-
ville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 847, 68 S.W.2d 411, 412 (1934). Nor was the holding
extended in Quebec itself, when all French-Canadians were slandered. Germain v. Ryan, 53
Que. Super. 543 (1918).
153. Golson v. Hearst Corp., 128 F. Supp. 110, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1005.
155. Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
156. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962), appeal dismissed
per curiamn and cert. denied, 376 U.S. 513 (1964). This decision has been criticized on the
basis that the "numbers" test, while not a perfect standard, was at least workable. 35 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 616 (1963).
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were generally accepted, only a defamation of a particular segment of a minority
group would be actionable. The possibility of recovery would, however, be
limited by the privilege of fair comment on matters of community concern, T
whether the words were taken as opinioncs or, under the more recent law, as
fact,a 9 for the larger the group defamed, the more the statement becomes a
matter of public domain.
IV. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER AND FIGHTING WORDS
It is evident that, at present, the law offers members of minority groups little
protection from insult. It is also clear that the evil resulting therefrom is far
outweighed by the fact that the civil liberties of all citizens are strengthened
when the bigot is not silenced. The minority group representatives, for the most
part, recognize this. What, however, would be the situation, where it was not
merely the pride of the class which was endangered but, rather, e,:istence itself?
As Mr. Justice Douglas noted in Beauharnais, a conspiracy aimed at destroy-
ing a race is not protected by the first amendment. This is something more than
free speech; it is "free speech plus."' 0c For the state to curb free speech, how-
ever, there must be more than a mere likelihood of danger.' Mr. Justice
Douglas observed that "the peril of speech must be clear and present, leaving
no room for argument, raising no doubts as to the necessity of curbing peech
in order to prevent disaster."'1 2
The clear and present danger doctrine came into being in 1917, when Con-
gress made its first encroachment upon freedom of speech and press since the
Alien'-6 and Sedition'04- Acts of the eighteenth century. The Espionage Act of
June 15, 1917,165 made it illegal to attempt to cause insubordination in the
armed forces or to obstruct their recruiting effort. In Schicnc, v. Unitcd States, c0
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act. Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated that "the question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent '10 7 It soon appeared
that these words were an illustration rather than a statement of constitutional
law. One week later, Mr. Justice Holmes, again speaking for the Court, upheld
the conviction of two other violators of the act, without using the clear and
157. Prosser, Torts § 110, at 312-16 (3d ed. 1964).
158. Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cerL denied, 319 U.S. 762 (1943).
159. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
160. Beauharnais v. fllinois, 343 US. 250, 284 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2S4-35 (Douglas, ., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2S5 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
163. Chs. 5S, 66, 1 Stat. 570, 577 (179S).
164. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (179S).
165. Ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 219.
166. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
167. Id. at 52.
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present danger test.168 Even though Justice Holmes later stated that clear and
present danger was to be a rule of law rather than empty verbiage, 00 the Court,
with the solitary exception of Justice Brandeis, 170 continued to ignore the rule
in the first decade after its creation. 171 This general disfavor with clear and
present danger continued through the 1930's. When the Court did strike down
a statute as violative of the first amendment, it used theories of vagueness, 172
prior restraint,173 or unreasonable restriction,17 4 but not the Holmes standard.
The 1940's marked the re-emergence of clear and present danger. In voiding
an Alabama statute which made picketing illegal, the Court held that "abridg-
ment of the liberty of .. .discussion [of matters of public interest] can be
justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circum-
stances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for
acceptance in the market of public opinion."'17 One month later, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,7 6 the Court extended 'the doctrine to cover public disturbances of
a non-union nature. In Cantwell, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses who were
passing out anti-Catholic literature and playing phonograph records on the
same theme in public were arrested for breach of the peace. The Court held that
the defendants' conduct was not punishable in the absence of a "clear and present
danger to a substantial interest of the state .... ,,177 Throughout this decade, the
first amendment came to have a "preferred position"'178 which apparently could
be defeated only by the presence of a clear and present danger.
There were, however, certain words which were beyond the protection of the
first amendment and -which did not have to meet the Holmes test. As delineated
168. Deb.s v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919).
169. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Brandeis, J., joining Holmes, J., dissenting);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ; Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Shaefer v. United States, 251
U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624
(1919), (Brandeis, J., joining Holmes, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
172. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931).
173. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
174. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organi-
zation, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
175. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940). (Footnote omitted.)
176. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
177. Id. at 311.
178. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 509 (1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See generally Berns, Freedom, Virtue & the First
Amendment (1957).
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in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,'70 these words "include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."'180 Because these words are not in a "preferred position," the state may
weigh them against "the social interest in order and morality" and punish the
utterance if it is construed as of "slight social value."18' Chaplinsky, who had
denounced all religion as a "racket" and the complainant as a "God damned
racketeer" and fascist, was prosecuted under a state statute8 2 which forbade
offensive remarks to a person lawfully in a public place. The complaint encom-
passed only the remark relating to the complainant and, under the words of the
state statute, it could be argued that only a statement of that nature was punish-
able. From the holding of the Court, however, it is clear that a state could
punish fighting words without the use of a colloquium if the words, as spoken,
could cause an ordinary man to breach the peace if the words were addressed
to him. A state statute designed to protect against breach of the peace would be
held constitutional if construed by the state court to disallow only the most
scurrilous words which are of "no essential part of any exposition of ideas." 18 3
The importance of the interpretation of breach of the peace statutes in state
courts upon the constitutionality of the punishment was reiterated seven years
later in Terminiello v. Chicago.l s4 Defendant, a renegade priest addressing the
Christian Veterans of America in Chicago on the alleged "atheistic Jew com-
munist" menace, attracted a crowd of one thousand protesters who surrounded
the auditorium where he was to speak. Terminiello was arrested for violating a
local ordinance which provided:
All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper
noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the
peace, within the limits of the city. . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct
.. . j
The trial court charged that
"breach of the peace" consists of any "misbehavior which violates the public peace
and decorum"; and that the "misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it
stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates
a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by
arousing alarm.' 1 6
179. 315 U.S. 56S (1942).
180. Id. at 572. (Footnote omitted.)
181. Ibid.
182. N.H. Laws of 1S85 ch. 37S, § 2.
183. 315 US. at 572. The Supreme Court recently affirmed this position in Garrion v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), wherein Mr. Justice Brennan proclaimed: "[T]he mowingly
false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not
enjoy constitutional protection.' Id. at 75. The "fighting words" doctrine was ued recently
to sustain the disorderly conduct conviction of the leader of the American Nazi Party. Rock-
well v. District of Columbia, 172 A.2d 549, 551 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1961).
184. 337 US. 1 (1949).
185. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 193-1 (1939).
186. 337 U.S. at 3.
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Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a five-to-four majority, held that the very pur-
pose of free speech is to invite dispute and that words such as those spoken by
the defendant could not be punished "unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."' 8 7
Terminiello marked the apex of the clear and present danger test, for the mi-
nority Justices in that case achieved majority in the 1950's and, led by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, rose to cripple its effect. As in Beauharnais, the Court
turned to a "balancing of interests" between free speech and press on the one
side, and public convenience on the other.188 Thus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter was
not adverse to the idea of allowing the states to resolve their balancing problem
by a process of trial and error. 189
The clear and present danger doctrine, however, may once again be rein-
carnated, depending on the philosophy of the justices currently sitting.190 It
is clear that, if the doctrine were to be applied in the area of race defamation,
the safety of the class as well as the civil liberties of the general public would be
protected.
V. THE WORLD VIEW
Because of constitutional prohibitions, the United States has remained aloof
from attempts to outlaw race defamation sponsored by the United Nations. 1 1
Thus, in 1963, when the call went out to all member states to "take immediate
and positive measures, including legislative and other measures, to prosecute
and/or outlaw organizations which promote or incite to racial discrimination or
incite to or use violence for the purposes of discrimination based on race, color
187. Id. at 4.
188. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951) (subversion); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)
(loyalty oaths).
189. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952). Mr. Justice Black termed this idea
of state experimentation in the muzzling of freedom of the press a "startling and frightening
doctrine in a country dedicated to self-government by its people." Id. at 270 (dissenting
opinion).
190. See Hudon, Freedom of Speech and Press in America 166 (1963). The doctrine's
hibernation has been disturbed occasionally in recent years. In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962), the Court discussed the doctrine in reversing a criminal contempt conviction.
Id. at 384-85. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court, while holding that clear
and present danger did not apply to a statute prohibiting the picketing of courthouses, care-
fully distinguished this situation from contempt cases. Id. at 563-64, 566.
191. Thus, when the original draft of the Genocide Convention made "cultural genocide"
a crime, the United States was instrumental in changing the text to forbid only actual
biological and physical genocide. U.N. Doc. No. E/623/11-19 (1948); see Comment, Geno-
cide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 Yale LJ. 1142, 1145 (1949). Furthermore, even
though Article III of the Convention makes it a crime to cause mental, as well as bodily
harm to the group, under Article IV the contracting parties agree to enforce the Convention
only when permissible under their respective constitutions. Hence the first amendment would
control any attempt at compliance on the part of the United States. See generally Id. at 1142.
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or ethnic origin,"'1 2 Ambassador Stevenson objected that such a measure "calls
for an invasion by the Government of the right of free speech, a right which the
Government is obliged to defend."'10 3
In contrast, over a score of nations, cutting across the political spectrum,
have national legislation aimed at proscribing the spread of racial hatred.104
Though the United States now represents the minority view, undue reliance on
any specific enactment cannot be justified. In the turmoil during the German
Weimar Republic, similar statutes were used to punish socialist and communist
defamers while their National Socialist counterparts were set free or let off
with a light fine after having used their trial for propaganda purposes. 0i Later,
when the Nazis came into power, the same statutes were used as an effective
weapon against criticism, the very result civil libertarians fear most. 100
VI. CONCLUSION
It is suggested that the minority groups will not be protected if the race-
baiter is driven underground. In fact, the airing of these obnoxious words should
serve to aid the group rather than to harm it, both by solidifying its ethos in
the midst of external attack'OT and by rallying the vast majority of the majority
to its side. Legislators should recognize this, in accord with the enlightened
leaders of the groups, and refrain from class libel legislation, rather than pander-
ing to the fears, understandable as they may be, of their minority constituents.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. Mlen feared witches and burnt
women. ' ' "S Where the danger to the group or to the entire community is clear
and present, the state can, and should, step in to offer its protective mantle.
Absent this, the miniscule protection which might be forthcoming is far out-
weighed by the ensuing danger to constitutional liberties.
192. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 9, § 2
(1963), in Lerner, The Crime of Incitement to Group Hatred 12 (1965).
193. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 18th Sess., Plenary 10 (AIPV. 1261) (1963).
194. See generally Lerner, The Crime of Incitement to Group Hatred 43-75 t195).
195. Though there were no specific class libel statutes in the Republic, Ricman, De-
mocracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 727, 729 (1942), the
Nazis violated individual criminal libel law when they attacked a collectivity by deriding a
member thereof, e.g., Baron Rothschild standing for the Jewo, id. at 723-29. Had there bzcn
class libel statutes, this process would merely have been compounded. Riesman concludes
that, "had the public and judicial attitude toward libel in Germany been as tolerant as it is
in the United States, the courtroom triumphs of the Nazis and other reactionaries would
have seemed less impressive, and might even never have occurred." Riezman , Democracy and
Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1104 (1942).
196. Id. at 1102-03. West Germany now has perhaps the most severe group libcl law in
the world. See 6th Strafrechtsanderungsgesetz, June 30, 1960 (Bundezgeetzblatt, pt. I, 473).
See generally Zuleeg, Group Defamation in West Germany, 13 Clev.-lar. L. Rev. 52 (1964).
197. See Bierstedt, The Social Order 433 (1957).
19S. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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